Based on individual occupational choice in a model including a production function with public investment and public health infrastructure, this paper presents an examination of how allocation of public investment and public health infrastructure affects the dynamics of income. Individuals work as skilled laborers or unskilled laborers, as in the model described by Caselli (1999) , and educational costs are necessary to work as a skilled laborer. Results show that government should provide both public investment and public health infrastructure to escape from the poverty trap with low income. Moreover, based on an initial allocation between public investment and public health infrastructure, it is decided how the government should form a policy to increase income growth.
Introduction
As explained by Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) and UN-HABITAT (2011) , African countries must be provided infrastructure (Transport, Modern Energy, Telecoms, Water System, Sanitation, andso on) to foster economic growth and to escape from poverty. Providing infrastructure can achieve the Millennium Development Goals. UN-HABITAT (2011) introduces to the macroeconomic empirical literature that the development of infrastructure brings about economic growth and productivity effects (Estache, Speciale and Veredas (2005) , Ayogu (2007) ). In developed countries, that infrastructure is sufficiently provided, but not in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan African countries.
1 Therefore, the government must carry out policies to increase the infrastructure. Governments in Sub-Saharan African countries for infrastructure spend, on average 6-12% of their gross domestic product(GDP) (UN-HABITAT (2011) ).
Referring to these data, we consider the manner in which the government should provide infrastructure. Some kinds of infrastructure exists. This paper presents examination of the allocation of the infrastructure of two types: one for public investment, which increases labor productivity (transport, telecoms, and so on) and the other for health infrastructure, which raises life expectancy (water system, sanitation, hospitals, and so on).
Based on simple Overlapping Generations Model (OLG), we discuss occupational choice, either skilled or unskilled, in addition to public investment with life expectancy. Especially, we address not only public investment but also life expectancy against dynamics. Many papers describe studies of capital accumulation by government. Barro (1990) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) , and Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) examine public capital accumulation and growth. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) show public accumulation and growth with human capital investment. Turnovsky (1997) also discusses public capital accumulation and growth and the difference between a socially planned economy and a decentralized economy. Yakita (2008) discusses an endogenized fertility rate and an aging economy † We would like to thank Shinji Miyake, Tamotsu Nakamura, and ToshikiTamai for helpful comments. Research for this paper was supported financially by Kwansei Gakuin University, the University of Kitakyushu and JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 26380253. Any remaining errors are solely the authors' responsibility. 94 including public accumulation. Public investment in these earlier studies serves an important role in increasing productivity.
Apart from public capital accumulation, many papers have described studies of educational choice. Maoz and Moav (2000) examine skill acquisition and inequality including intergenerational mobility. Caselli (1999) and Galor and Moav (2000) introduce an idea that people have to pay the cost and learn new skills to work with new technology. Chen (2010) uses an overlapping generations model with life expectancy and educational choice.
Some studies have been conducted on the assumption that life expectancy is set exogenously, such as Chen (2010) . However, some papers consider life expectancy as an endogenous variable. Chakraborty (2004) and Hashimoto and Tabata (2005) set the model that life expectancy depends on public expenditure for health infrastructure, such as hospitals, clean water supply, and so on. By virtue of public expenditure, income per capita increases because capital accumulation is stimulated.
2 Chakraborty and Das (2005) and Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) use an economy model in which private health investmentcan raise life expectancy and income per capita because of an increase in the saving rate.
In fact, we can consider two reasons that an economy might become enmired in a poverty trap with low income: low productivity and a low saving rate. If a government provides public infrastructure, then the productivity of labor and capital increases. Thereby, the model economy escapes from the poverty trap. However, an increase in public health infrastructure raises the saving rate and then labor productivity rises thanks to an increase in capital accumulation. Finally, the model economy escapes from the poverty trap. Our paper presents examination as the following process. First, based on Chen (2010) , the paper presents public expenditure of two types (public investment and public health infrastructure) and examines what the government should provide to escape from the poverty trap. Second, after escaping from the poverty trap, the paper presents derivation of how the government allocates tax revenue between public investment and public health infrastructure to increase income growth.
As derived in this paper, the allocation for public health infrastructure to escape from the poverty trap should be within a certain range. If this allocation is large, because of a decrease in public infrastructure and low productivity of labor, then the economy can not escape from the poverty trap. However, if the allocation for public investment is large, then capital accumulation is prevented and productivity of labor is low and the economy can not escape from the poverty trap. Moreover, based on the initial allocation, the government is expected to provide public infrastructure or public health infrastructure to raise the income growth rate. The results obtained in this study show how the government provides a policy tobring about income growth with a given tax revenue.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents a description of equilibrium and macroeconomic dynamics and derives the conditions under which income growth continues. Lastly, we summarize the salient points of the paper.
The Model
The model economy is based on a two-period (young and old) overlapping generations model. This economy has agents of three types: households, firms, and a government.
Households
Households experience two periods: young and old. During the young period, each household supplies labor inelasticity to earn labor income. This economy accommodates labor of two types: skilled laborand unskilled labor. Education costs must be incurred in order to become a skilled laborer, as assumed by Caselli (1999) , Meckl and Zink (2004) , Miyake, Muro, Nakamura, and Yasuoka (2009) , and by Chen(2010) . That cost is assumed as  . Herein, s t w denotes the wagerate of skilled labor. The government imposes labor income taxation on the wage income of skilled labor to provide public investment andpublic health infrastructure. Each household allocates its labor income between consumption in the young period and saving. Consequently, we obtain the following budget constraint:
2 Hashimoto and Tabata (2005) derived the relation between health infrastructure and fertility. 
Indexes s and u respectively denote skilled labor and unskilled labor. 
If a worker is an unskilled laborer, then
    
Firms
This paper assumes the production function shown below.
Therein, denotes the aggregate output. and respectively denote public investment and capital stock.
denotes the skilled labor amount. Assuming that the population size of each generation is unity, then the unskilled labor amount is shown as . With a perfectly competitive market, profit maximization reduces the following equations, as ,
4 Some papers consider a production function with public investment. For example, Barro (1990) assumed Caselli (1999) assumed that not only labor but also capital stock is inputted as a productive factor in the unskilled sector. Neither Caselli (1999) nor Chen (2010) considered public investment. 
The interest rate is shown as .
It is noteworthy that .
Capital stock is assumed to be fully depreciated in one period.
Government
The government imposes labor income taxation at a tax rate  on skilled labor to provide public investment t G and public health infrastructure t H . Public health infrastructure is regarded as hospitals, cleanwater systems, and so on to raise life expectancy. Then, the government budget constraint is presented as
Our paper assumes the following allocation rule. 
Equilibrium
This section presents derivation of the equilibrium of this model economy. If workers move freely between two sectors, then the indifference condition is described as
Considering (9), (14), and (16), t L is given as 
where
6 This paper assumes
Therefore, the dynamics of capital stock at
, and
Therefore, calculating   
, there exist dynamics of two types. The first is that income growth occurs for any 0 K (Fig.1) . The second is that income growth occurs or does not occur for given 0 K (Fig.2) . This proposition is intuitive. If  is small, then public health infrastructure is large but public investment is small.
Small public investment decreases labor productivity and the income level. Then, the saving is small and capital accumulation is not large. Therefore, the economy can not escape from the poverty trap. However, if
 is large, then public investment is large but public health infrastructureis small. Small public health infrastructure brings about short life expectancy and the saving rate is low.
However, if the condition of (24) We obtain this condition as ( ) . This condition shows that the effect to decrease capital accumulation by an increase in  is small. 
